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COMMENT
RETROACTIVITY AND THE FUTURE OF SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION IN MARYLAND
By: Timothy J. Gilbert1
INTRODUCTION
aryland’s statutory sex offender registration scheme2 requires certain
convicted sex offenders3 residing in Maryland to register with the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the Department), or
to register with another law enforcement or correctional entity for certain
lengths of time4 depending on the offense(s) for which they were convicted.5
Among them are potentially “thousands of Maryland sex offenders”6 who have
been required to register for offenses committed before the enactment of
Maryland’s registration scheme.7 Retroactive application of sex offender
registration schemes like Maryland’s, under the direction of the federal Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),8 has prompted a variety
of ex post facto challenges nationwide including challenges on federal and
state constitutional grounds.9

M

1

J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law.
See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 11-701 to -727 (2013).
3
See id. § 11-704. Certain adjudicated juvenile sex offenders are also required to
register with the Department; however, the nuances of the juvenile sex offender
registry are outside the scope of this comment.
4
Id. § 11-707.
5
See id. § 11-701(o)-(q) (identifying that sexual offenses are assigned to one of three
“tiers”); see also infra note 42 and accompanying text.
6
Appellant’s Pet. for Writ of Cert. 9, Roe v. Maynard, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947
(2013) [hereinafter State Certiorari Petition], decision reached on appeal by Dep't of
Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 439 Md. 201, 94 A.3d 791 (2014). Counsel for
the Department later reported the number of offenders in this retroactive class as
1,250 during oral argument on May 6, 2014.
7
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1(a). Maryland’s first sex offender
registration scheme was originally enacted in 1995 and applied prospectively only.
See 1995 Md. Laws, Ch. 142 (codified at Art. 27, § 692B). The statute's successor
required certain offenders convicted of identified sex offenses on or after October 1,
1995, for offenses committed before that date to register. See 2001 Md. Laws, Ch.
221 (later codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1); 2009 Md. Laws,
Ch. 541 (later codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1); 2010 Md.
Laws, Ch. 175 (later codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1).
8
42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16929 (2013).
9
See William M. Howard, Annotation, Validity of State Sex Offender Registration
Laws Under Ex Post Facto Prohibitions, 63 A.L.R. 6th 351 (2011).
2
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A plurality of the Court of Appeals of Maryland sustained an ex post facto
challenge to Maryland’s statutory retroactive registration requirement on state
constitutional grounds10 in Doe v. Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services.11 In Doe I, the court joined other states12 in
contravening the Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusion on an identical
issue in Smith v. Doe,13 which held that Alaska’s retroactive sex offender
registration statute did not constitute punishment sufficient to sustain a
challenge under the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution.14 The
court of appeals held in Doe I that the application and consequences of
Maryland’s retroactive registration requirement constituted an impermissible
ex post facto punishment prohibited by Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.15
This comment will analyze the effect of two recent landmark court of
appeals rulings on Maryland’s ex post facto jurisprudence, focusing on the
legality and propriety of the State’s retroactive sex offender registration
requirements under the encouragement of federal SORNA registration
standards. Part I discusses the statutory development of Maryland’s sex
offender registration law in the context of the federal standards and provides
an overview of pertinent ex post facto case law. It further discusses two
Maryland cases that sparked the ex post facto controversy with respect to
retroactive sex offender registration obligations. Part II outlines problems
created in the wake of the Doe plurality holding, including a potential wave of
challenges by registrants convicted before the enactment of Maryland’s law,
the challenges faced by the State in pursuit of certain federal grant funding,
and subsequent appellate dispute16 before the Court of Appeals of Maryland
regarding the interplay between federal and state sex offender registration
laws. Part III proposes a possible solution that would result in an equitable
balance between public safety, fiscal responsibility, and effective sex offender
registration and monitoring in Maryland.

10

See infra Part I.d.
430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123 (2013) (hereinafter Doe I).
12
See discussion infra Part I.e.
13
538 U.S. 84 (2003).
14
Id. at 105-06.
15
Doe I, 430 Md. at 568, 62 A.3d at 143.
16
The recent consolidated opinion in Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services v. Doe and Hershberger v. Roe is the culminating Court of Appeals of
Maryland decision on retroactive sex offender registration in Maryland. See Dept. of
Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 439 Md. 201, 94 A.3d 791 (2014) (hereinafter
Doe II); see also infra note 143.
11
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I. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION IN MARYLAND
A. Background
Congress originally established national standards for sex offender
registration in 1994 by passing the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Act.17 The Wetterling Act conditions a portion
of federal law enforcement grant funding to states on their adoption and
enactment of registration laws based upon the minimum federal standards.18
Following substantial amendments to the Wetterling Act, the Attorney General
was tasked with issuing guidelines and regulations to interpret the current
iteration of the federal statute.19 The federal act is now known as Title I of the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).20
Sex offender registration and notification programs in the United States,
according to the Attorney General, serve important public safety purposes.
They include tracking sex offenders following their release into the
community and providing broad notice to the public and law enforcement of
their whereabouts.21 SORNA sought to “close potential gaps and loopholes”
caused by “piecemeal amendments” to the existing federal standards, and to
“strengthen the nationwide network of sex offender registration and
notification programs.”22 At the time the final guidelines were promulgated,
each state and the District of Columbia had passed sex offender registration
laws.23
The Maryland General Assembly enacted the state’s first sex offender
registration statute in 1995.24 The law was prompted both by the 1994
17

42 U.S.C. §§ 14071-14073, repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. I, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 600 (2006); see also
National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. Reg.
38030, 38045 (Jul. 2, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Guidelines], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-07-02/pdf/E8-14656.pdf; Doe II, 439 Md. at
222 n.12, 94 A.3d at 803 n.12.
18
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 89-90; 42 U.S.C. § 16925(d).
19
42 U.S.C. § 16912(b) (2013).
20
42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16929 (2013); Doe II, 439 Md. at 222, 94 A.3d at 803. The
full extent of the revision of both the federal standards and Maryland’s statutes is
beyond the scope of this comment. This comment will focus on the evolution of
Maryland’s statute to apply retroactively to offenders convicted before the enactment
of each.
21
2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38044-45.
22
Id. at 38045; see also Doe II, 439 Md. at 222-23, 94 A.3d at 803.
23
2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38044; see also Sarah Tofte, No Easy Answers:
Sex Offender Laws in the US, 19 No.4(G) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2, 48 (2007).
24
Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 336-37, 772 A.2d 1225, 1230 (2001) (citing 1995
Md. Laws, Ch. 142).
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Wetterling Act and in part by public outrage over the sexual assault of a young
Dundalk child in the summer of 1993.25 The child victim and his parents
became aware of the convicted molester’s release only by observing him in
their community after having been released from prison earlier than
expected.26 At its inception and in an effort to notify the surrounding
community of the offender’s presence, the Maryland statute was only applied
prospectively, requiring certain sex offenders to notify law enforcement of
their presence in the county where he or she intended to live once released.27
Meanwhile, the federal standards have undergone significant revision.28
B. Retroactive Registration in Maryland: How We Got Here
SORNA delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General29 “to specify the
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted
before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular
jurisdiction . . . .”30 In 2007, the Attorney General published an interim rule
specifying that SORNA applies retroactively and requires implementing
jurisdictions to subject sex offenders convicted before the enactment of
SORNA to its registration and public notification requirements and to modify
their programs accordingly to remain compliant with the federal standards.31
In 2008 the Department of Justice published the Attorney General’s final
guidelines, which reinforced the retroactivity requirements outlined in the

25

Gregory G. Gillette, The Maryland Survey: 1994-1995: Recent Developments: The
Maryland General Assembly, 55 MD. L. REV. 847, 852 (1996) (The current iteration
of the federal statute expressly states its purpose to respond to “vicious attacks by
violent predators” against several children and adults including Jacob Wetterling,
abducted at age 11 in 1989.); 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2013).
26
Gillette, supra note 25, at 852.
27
Graves, 364 Md. at 337, 772 A.2d at 1230; see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC.§ 11-702.1(a) (2013).
28
2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38030.
29
All references herein to the Attorney General refer to the Attorney General of the
United States.
30
42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006) (the federal Act facially applies directly to sex
offenders nationwide); see also Doe II, 439 Md. 201, 223, 94 A.3d 791, 804; infra
Part II for a discussion of federalism, statutory construction, and SORNA’s
interaction with state law.
31
Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg.
8894-01 (February 28, 2007) (later codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72) (The Attorney
General’s requirements as they relate to implementing jurisdictions are “only
conditions required to avoid the reduction in Federal funding under [SORNA].”); see
also Doe II, 439 Md. at 223, 94 A.3d at 804 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16925(d)).
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interim rule.32 Citing the 2003 holding in Smith v. Doe,33 the Attorney General
noted that the application of the SORNA standards to sex offenders whose
convictions predate SORNA creates no ex post facto problem:
[B]ecause the SORNA sex offender registration and
notification requirements are intended to be non-punitive,
regulatory measures adopted for public safety purposes, and
hence may validly be applied (and enforced by criminal
sanctions34) against sex offenders whose predicate
convictions occurred prior to the creation of these
requirements.35
Despite the Attorney General’s narrowing of the retroactive class via
supplemental guidelines in 2011,36 the apparent precedent keeping preSORNA offenders within its reach is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith v.
Doe.37
Maryland, like seventeen other states and several tribal jurisdictions and
territories, has “substantially implemented” SORNA’s requirements in its
existing sex offender tracking program.38 Accordingly, Maryland’s sex
offender registration and notification statutes have also undergone a number

32

The 2008 Guidelines state:
The applicability of the SORNA requirements is not limited to sex
offenders whose predicate sex offense convictions occur following
a jurisdiction’s implementation of a conforming registration
program. Rather, SORNA’s requirements took effect when
SORNA was enacted on July 27, 2006, and they have applied
since that time to all sex offenders, including those whose
convictions predate SORNA’s enactment.

2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38046.
33
538 U.S. at 85.
34
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (subjecting those convicted of a SORNA sex offense
to a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both for failing to register with the
destination jurisdiction as required by SORNA when traveling in interstate or foreign
commerce). Failure to register occurring after SORNA’s enactment and the effective
date of the regulation indicates that SORNA applies to all sex offenders. See U.S. v.
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2010).
35
2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38046 (citing 72 Fed. Reg. 8894-01, 8896;
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2013)).
36
76 Fed. Reg. 1630-01, 1630, 1639 (Jan. 11, 2011).
37
538 U.S. 84 (2003); see also supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
38
Doe II, 439 Md. 201, 224, 62 A.3d 791, 804.
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of significant revisions to remain compliant with SORNA’s requirements in
pursuit of federal grant funds.39
In 1999, the General Assembly substantially modified Maryland’s
registration statute, retroactively subjecting certain categories of sex offenders
to lifetime registration.40 Again in 2009, further revisions retroactively
required certain sex offenders committing their offenses prior to October 1,
1995, and convicted on or after that date, who were not previously required to
register under Maryland law, to register as sex offenders.41 In 2010, further
amendments adopted SORNA’s tiered offender classification structure,
retroactively increasing the registration obligation of those offenders newly
classified as tier-III offenders to lifetime registration.42
Angel Ochoa is one Maryland offender who, in 2013, sought declaratory
relief after his ten-year post-conviction registration obligation was converted
to a lifetime registration obligation pursuant to revisions of Maryland’s
statue.43 A majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Ochoa applied
the heavily revised Maryland registration statute, holding that Ochoa was
subject to lifetime registration pursuant to those revisions despite having
satisfied the previous statutorily imposed ten-year registration requirement.44
The majority’s straightforward statutory interpretation and application
eschewed any ex post facto analysis.45 Chief Judge Bell’s dissent criticized
the statutory revisions, which have subtly evolved to recapture Maryland
offenders convicted prior to SORNA’s existence, as obfuscated.46 The Ochoa
case illustrates Maryland’s statutory evolution leading to the recent ex post
facto legal bottleneck faced by Maryland lawmakers and regulators today.47

39

See, e.g., Fiscal Note to S.B. 73, 413th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Md. 1999),
available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/1999rs/fnotes/bil_0003
/sb0073.pdf (S.B. 73 was later enacted as 1999 Md. Laws, ch. 317); see also Doe I,
430 Md. 535, 545-46, 62 A.3d 123, 129 (providing background on the evolution of
Maryland's sex offender registration laws).
40
1999 Md. Laws, ch. 317, art. 27(D)(2); see also Ochoa v. Dept. of Pub. Safety and
Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 315, 319-21, 61 A.3d 1, 3-4 (2013).
41
2009 Md. Laws, ch. 541, § 2(a)(5); Doe I, 430 Md. at 545-46, 62 A.3d at 129; Doe
II, 439 Md. at 223, 62 A.3d at 804.
42
2010 Md. Laws, ch. 174-75; Doe I, 430 Md. at 541, 62 A.3d at 126; Doe II, 439
Md. at 223, 94 A.3d at 804.
43
Ochoa, 430 Md. at 316, 61 A.3d at 1-2.
44
Id. at 316-17, 61 A.3d at 2.
45
Id. The issue on which Ochoa appealed did not contemplate an ex post facto
challenge.
46
See id. at 340, (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (“An individual in the petitioner’s petition,
looking to all these statutes, at best, would have a very difficult time ascertaining the
current status of his registration obligation. . . . It is simply unfair for this Court to
hold the petitioner responsible for deciphering the complicated and often inscrutable
history of Maryland’s sex offender registration laws.”).
47
See infra Part II.
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C. The Ex Post Facto Prohibition
Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides “[t]hat
retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such
Laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and
incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made;
or any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required.”48 The
United States Constitution prohibits states from “pass[ing] any Bill of
Attainder [or] ex post facto Law.”49 The juxtaposition is important because as
is the case in Maryland, criminal defendants may be afforded broader
protections under individual states’ constitutions.50
Justice Chase in 1798 endeavored to interpret the federal Constitution’s ex
post facto prohibition:
Laws considered ex post facto laws, within the words and the
intent of the prohibition, include: (1) Every law that makes an
action, done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. (2)
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed.
(3) Every law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed. (4) Every law that
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.51
....
[But] [e]very ex post facto law must necessarily be
retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex post
facto law: The former, only, are prohibited. . . . [T]here are
cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the
community, and also of individuals, relate to a time
antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion, or
of pardon.52

48

MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 17 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
50
See Doe I, 430 Md. 535, 548-49, 62 A.3d 123, 131; Doe II, 439 Md. 201, 235, 94
A.3d 791, 811; see also infra note 68 and accompanying text.
51
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
52
Id. at 391. Justice Chase relied in part on Maryland’s Constitution in making his
opinion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has also determined that “not every law
passed after the commission of an offense, which changes the consequences of that
offense, is barred by the ex post facto provision.” Doe I, 430 Md. at 560-61, 62 A.3d
49
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Justice Chase also noted that the Supreme Court of the United States “has no
jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state legislature, contrary to the
Constitution of such state, is void.”53 Maryland’s ex post facto clause, like its
federal equivalent, has been interpreted to apply only to criminal laws.54
D. Doe and Ex Post Facto Interpretation in Maryland
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has historically interpreted the state’s
constitutional ex post facto prohibition in pari materia with that of the Federal
Constitution, and has in the past held that the clauses have the same meaning.55
Almost 100 years after Calder, the court in 1987 adopted the “disadvantage”
standard in analyzing a federal ex post facto issue.56 By that standard the ex
post facto “prohibition ‘extends broadly to any law passed after the
commission of an offense which . . . in relation to that offense, or its
consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage . . . .’”57
The Supreme Court abandoned this standard in 1990 by expressly
overruling Kring in Collins v. Youngblood.58 In Collins, the Supreme Court
returned to analyzing ex post facto problems within the confines of Calder’s
four elements.59 Then in 2003, in the context of SORNA-inspired retroactive
state sex offender registration analyzed under the Federal Constitution’s ex
post facto prohibition, the Supreme Court in Smith employed a two-part intenteffects test to hold that Alaska’s retroactive sex offender registration statute
did not violate the Federal Constitution’s ex post facto prohibition.60 The issue
at 138 (quoting Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 310 Md. 217, 226,
528 A.2d 904, 909 (1987)).
53
Calder, 3 U.S. at 392.
54
Doe I, 430 Md. at 553-54, 62 A.3d at 134 (quoting Anderson, 310 Md. at 223, 528
A.2d at 907).
55
See Sec’y, Dept. of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs. v. Demby, 390 Md. 580, 608, 890
A.2d 310, 327 (2006); Doe I, 430 Md. at 548, 62 A.3d at 130-31. The court departs
from this interpretation in Doe I. See Doe I, 430 Md. at 551, 62 A.3d at 132.
56
Doe I, 430 Md. at 554, 62 A.3d at 134 (citing Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221,
235 (1883), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (standard
adopted in Anderson, 310 Md. at 224, 528 A.2d at 908).
57
Id. at 554, 62 A.3d at 134 (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson, 310 Md. at
224, 528 A.2d at 908).
58
497 U.S. 37, 50 (1990); see also Doe I, 430 Md. at 581, 62 A.3d at 150 (Barbera,
J., dissenting).
59
Collins, 497 U.S. at 50; see also supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
60
Doe I, 430 Md. at 556-57, 62 A.3d at 135-36, (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84
(2003)). The Supreme Court utilized seven factors in its ex post facto analysis:
whether the regulatory scheme has been regarded as punishment in the nation’s
history and traditions; whether the scheme subjects respondents to affirmative
disability or restraint; whether it promotes traditional aims of punishment; whether it
has a rational connection to a legitimate non-punitive objective; whether the scheme
is not excessive with respect to its purpose; whether a finding of scienter is required
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of sex offender registration retroactivity was one of first impression in Smith,
and the opinion is widely cited.61
The intent-effects test in Smith sought to “ascertain whether the legislature
meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.”62
If the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil
and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the
statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil . . . [O]nly the
clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty.63
Despite Maryland’s traditional interpretation of its constitution’s ex post
facto prohibition in pari materia with federal ex post facto jurisprudence,64 a
divided Court of Appeals of Maryland in a plurality opinion in Doe I65 refused
to unanimously apply the intent-effects test and instead retained the
disadvantage standard in deciding that Mr. Doe could not, under Maryland’s
constitution, be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the retroactive
provision in Maryland’s sex offender registration statute.66 Judge Greene,
invoking a rule articulated in Dua v. Comcast Cable of Maryland, Inc.,67 noted
that while the Court of Appeals of Maryland has generally interpreted its
constitutional ex post facto provision in pari materia with the federal
Constitution, the federal interpretation is merely persuasive and the court’s
interpretation of Maryland’s constitution is not thereby limited.68
to trigger its operation; and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime. Smith, 538 U.S. at 86-87 (citations omitted).
61
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 92.
62
Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
63
Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980) and Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
64
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
65
Doe I, 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123.
66
Id. at 551, 62 A.3d at 132-33. The Department in its petition for certiorari in Roe
pointed out that four out of seven judges on the Court of Appeals of Maryland (a
majority) elected to utilize the federal intent-effects test. Of them, two found that
Maryland’s scheme was overly punitive in effect and two found that it was not,
thereby creating no ex post facto problem. The Court of Appeals in Doe II rejected
the Department’s plea to reconsider the holding in Doe I on the basis that “the
decision provides inadequate guidance to the lower courts . . . [and that] there is no
single rationale that commanded a majority of the judges in Doe I . . . .” Doe II, 439
Md. at 218, 94 A.3d at 801.
67
370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002).
68
Doe I, 430 Md. at 549, 62 A.3d at 131. Judge Greene noted that Maryland’s
Constitutional ex post facto protections may be broader than those of the federal
Constitution and that the Supreme Court has sanctioned broader interpretations of
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The 2013 Court of Appeals of Maryland plurality decision in Doe I marks
a departure from the court’s consistent interpretation of Maryland’s ex post
facto prohibition in pari materia with the federal Constitution.69 Mr. Doe70
pled guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of child sexual abuse for his
inappropriate conduct with a thirteen-year-old student that occurred during the
1983-84 school year while he was employed at the school as a teacher.71 The
conviction, however, did not occur until the victim ultimately came forward in
2006, after the initial enactment of Maryland’s first sex offender registration
scheme.72 Although the plea agreement itself did not expressly contemplate
Doe’s registration as a sex offender,73 he was required to register pursuant to
the then-existing statute as a condition of his three-year supervised probation
following release from his four and one-half year unsuspended prison term.74
Mr. Doe, however, successfully challenged the portion of his sentence
requiring registration as a sex offender because he did not meet the thenexisting express statutory conditions requiring registration at the time of his
conviction.75
Approximately five months after Mr. Doe’s release from prison in 2008,
Governor O’Malley signed Senate Bill 425 into law, which modified the
statute’s retroactivity provision and required him to register as a child sex
offender.76 Mr. Doe registered under protest pursuant to his probation officer’s

such states. Id. at 550, 62 A.3d at 131-32 n.13 (citing William J. Brennan Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977));
see also Doe II, 439 Md. at 235, 94 A.3d at 811 (“Marylanders, like Hoosiers, enjoy
‘greater protection under the prohibition on ex post facto laws’ of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.”) (citing Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494, 502 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012)).
69
See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
70
John Doe is a pseudonym used in these cases after the offender had his name
stricken from the record. See Doe I, 430 Md. at 538, 62 A.3d at 124 n.3.
71
Id. Doe II provides an additional overview of the facts and procedural history in
Mr. Doe’s and Mr. Roe’s cases. Doe II, 439 Md. at 208-14, 94 A.3d at 795-98.
72
Doe I, 430 Md. at 538, 62 A.3d at 125. See also supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
73
Doe I, 430 Md. at 539, 62 A.3d at 125. For purposes of Maryland’s registration
obligation, a guilty plea qualifies as a conviction, without any other statutory
mention of the effect of a guilty plea on the obligation. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 11-702 (2013).
74
Doe I, 430 Md. at 539-40, 62 A.3d at 125.
75
Id. at 540, 62 A.3d at 125-26.
76
Id. at 540, 62 A.3d at 126. “The Department shall contact and notify each person
who is not under the custody or supervision of a supervising authority on October 1,
2009, for whom registration is required under . . . this subsection.” 2009 Md. Laws,
ch. 541 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-707(c)(2)). The passage of
this amendment undoubtedly blindsided many convicted sex offenders not
previously required to register.
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direction, “under threat of ‘arrest[] and incarcerat[ion] . . . .’”77 Later in 2009,
Mr. Doe filed a civil complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not
required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Maryland’s SORNA-inspired
statute.78 Not until after the trial court denied Mr. Doe’s complaint for
declaratory relief, in part for lack of an ex post facto problem, did he raise that
issue on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.79 The court of special appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision in an unreported opinion80 and the Court of
Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari to consider, inter alia, the
federal and state ex post facto prohibitions.81
Unlike in Ochoa, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe I considered
whether Maryland’s registration statute constituted an ex post facto violation
as applied to Mr. Doe.82 Judge Greene’s plurality opinion, however, resolved
the issue solely on state constitutional grounds,83 definitively diverging from
a reading of Article 17’s ex post facto prohibition in pari materia with that of
the federal Constitution.84 The decision, while a victory for Mr. Doe and
Maryland’s retroactively registered offenders, left much instability and
uncertainty not only in the court’s ex post facto analysis, but also in the
implementation of the State’s current retroactive sex offender statutes by the
executive branch.85
Judge Greene, Judge Eldridge, and Chief Judge Bell held for the plurality
in Doe I that “[b]ased upon principles of fundamental fairness and the right to
fair warning within the meaning of Article 17, retrospective application of the
77

Doe I, 430 Md. at 540-41, 62 A.3d at 126.
Id. at 541, 62 A.3d at 126. Meanwhile, the Maryland General Assembly modified
the registration statute again, categorizing Doe as a Tier-III lifetime registrant. Id. It
is worth noting that Doe did not advance a constitutional ex post facto argument in
his complaint; rather, it was the Department that argued the absence of an ex post
facto violation during a hearing on the complaint, thereby preserving the issue for
appeal. Id. at 541-42, 543-44, 62 A.3d at 127-28.
79
In addition to the ex post facto issue, Doe challenged the statute on bill of
attainder, equal protection, and due process grounds. Id. at 542, 62 A.3d at 127.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 542-43, 62 A.3d at 127.
82
See Doe I, 430 Md. at 553, 62 A.3d at 133.
83
See id. at 547, 62 A.3d at 130. The plurality opinion by Judge Greene also
represented the opinions of Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge (retired, specially
assigned). See id. at 578 n.1, 62 A.3d at 149 n.1 (Barbera, J., dissenting).
84
Id. at 551, 553, 558, 62 A.3d at 132, 134, 137. The salient effect of deciding the
case on state constitutional grounds is the insulation from review by the Supreme
Court, which would only decide the case on federal constitutional grounds. See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
85
State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 9. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae at
17-22, Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123
(2013) (No. 125) 2012 WL 1969096, at *17-45 [hereinafter Amicus Brief]
(providing a detailed history of Maryland’s Declaration of Rights Article 17 ex post
facto prohibition).
78
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sex offender registration statute to Petitioner is unconstitutional.”86 Judge
Greene’s application of the disadvantage standard expressly relied in part on
the brief of amici curiae, which outlined in detail the actual requirements of
registrants and the multitude of adverse practical effects of registration.87
These include requirements that the registrant register and report in person;
disclose detailed private information; notify law enforcement with changes in
e-mail addresses, phone numbers, mailing addresses, and school enrollment
information; restrictions on the registrants’ travel and their ability to enter
certain property; and widespread public dissemination of personal and private
information on the Department’s website.88 These restrictions also impose
substantial housing and employment problems on registrants and generate
threats, which amount to punishment akin to public shaming.89 The court
found that the retroactive sweep of the registration statute at the time of Mr.
Doe’s conviction “had an effect that was the equivalent of placing Petitioner
on probation for life as a result of his sex offense.”90
Furthermore, referencing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Smith, Judge Greene
agreed that the public dissemination of registrants’ information is “tantamount
to the historical punishment of shaming[,]”91 suggesting that the Department’s
placement of a searchable color picture of registrants along with detailed

86

Doe I, 430 Md. at 553, 62 A.3d at 133. The holding renders MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 11-702.1 (Retroactive Application of Subtitle) unconstitutional on
state grounds, thereby rendering § 11-704 (Persons Subject to Registration)
prospective only.
87
See id. at 566-67, 62 A.3d at 142; see also Amicus Brief, supra note 85 at 7-16.
Regardless of whether the court utilized the disadvantage standard or the more
deferential intent-effects test, five of seven judges on the court of appeals determined
that Maryland’s registration scheme was overly punitive and violated Article 17 of
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights.
88
“These restrictions and obligations have the same practical effect of placing
Petitioner on probation or parole.” Doe I, 430 Md. at 562-63, 62 A.3d at 139 (citing
Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 99, 1012 (Alaska 2008)).
89
See Amicus Brief, supra note 85 at 7-16. The Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services’ website provides the following warning on its search results
page: “Warning – Do not use this information to unlawfully injure, harass, or
commit a crime against any individual named in the registry or residing or working
at any reported address. Such action could result in civil or criminal penalties.”
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY AND CORR. SERV., Maryland SOR Search,
www.dpscs.state.md.us/sorSearch/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2013). The warning does
not appear until a search or browse is conducted. See Tofte, supra note 23, for a
comprehensive report of the purported adverse effects imposed on registrants.
90
Doe I, 430 Md. at 564, 62 A.3d at 140.
91
Id. at 564-66, 62 A.3d at 140-41 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
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information including an icon on a map marking the offender’s home rises to
the level of shunning the offender within their community.92
Judges McDonald and Adkins concurred in the result, instead by reading
Article 17 in pari materia with the federal Constitution’s ex post facto
prohibition.93 Finding “no principled reason” to “differentiat[e] [Article 17’s]
prohibition against ex post facto laws from the parallel prohibition in the
Federal Constitution[,]”94 Judge McDonald opined that the 2009 and 2010
amendments to Maryland’s sex offender registry implicates the effects prong
of the federal intent-effects test by “t[aking the] law across the line from civil
regulation to an element of the punishment of offenders.”95
In her dissent, Judge Barbera agreed that Maryland’s Article 17 should be
read in pari materia with the federal Constitution, but believed that Mr. Doe
did not meet the clearest proof burden, set forth by the Supreme Court in
Smith’s intent-effects test.96 Under that analysis, Judge Barbera would have
held that Maryland’s registration statute does not “override legislative intent
and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty.”97 Judge Barbera determined that the legislature did not intend the
2009 and 2010 amendments to be punitive, but rather to serve “public safety,
regulatory ends,” and that no ex post facto problem existed.98
Although Judge Harrell did not agree with the plurality analysis, he
nonetheless concurred in the result, sealing a 6-1 vote in favor of Mr. Doe.99
Judge Harrell would have ordered specific performance of Mr. Doe’s 2006
plea agreement, which did not include registering as a sex offender, pursuant
to the procedural safeguards underlying Maryland Rule 4-243100 and the rule

92

Id. at 566, 62 A.3d at 141-42. Judge Greene noted that the public display of the
registrants’ address and other information, allowing members of the registrants’
communities in which they live, work, or attend school, impermissibly resembles
shaming for purposes of Maryland’s ex post facto prohibition. Id. at 568, 62 A.3d at
142-43.
93
See id. at 577-78, 62 A.3d at 148-49 (McDonald, J., concurring).
94
Id.
95
Doe I, 430 Md. at 577-78, 62 A.3d at 148-49 (McDonald, J., concurring)
96
Id. at 586, 62 A.3d at 154 (Barbera, J., dissenting). Judge Barbera became Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in July 2013.
97
Id. (Barbera, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)) (noting
that the plurality opinion did not even establish the threshold requirement in any ex
post facto violation that Maryland’s registration statute is a “criminal or penal law”).
98
Id. at 587, 62 A.3d at 154. (Barbera, J., dissenting). Judge Barbera also provided
authority interpreting SORNA’s civil, regulatory purpose at the federal level, noting
extensive failure of ex post facto challenges to SORNA in federal courts. Id. at 589,
62 A.3d at 155 (Barbera, J., dissenting).
99
Doe I, 430 Md. at 569, 62 A.3d at 143 (Harrell, J., concurring).
100
Id. at 576, 62 A.2d at 147 (Harrell, J., concurring) (citing Cuffley v. State, 416
Md. 568, 580-81, 7 A.3d 557, 563-65 (2010)) (referencing the four corners of the
plea agreement approach).
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of lenity.101 Although concurring in the result on this unique basis, Judge
Harrell agreed with the dissent—Judges McDonald, Adkins, and Barbera—
that Maryland’s ex post facto prohibition should be read in pari materia with
the federal Constitution, thus requiring the court to apply the more deferential
intent-effects test.102 This opinion, though contemning the statutory operation
of Maryland’s sex offender registration system in light of the plea agreement,
formed a 4-3 majority agreement that Article 17 should be read in pari materia
with the federal Constitution.103
E. Other Courts’ Decisions on the Issue
State and federal appellate courts, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, have repeatedly held that imposing restrictive measures on sex
offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a legitimate nonpunitive government
objective,104 and have rejected ex post facto claims by offenders required to
register retroactively.105 For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld West Virginia’s registration and notification statute as civil and

101

Concurring in Doe I, Judge Harrell wrote:
Determining the meaning of a sentencing term in a plea agreement
requires strict adherence to the ‘four corners’ of the plea agreement
as established in the Maryland Rule 4-243 plea proceeding and to
‘due process concerns for fairness and adequacy of procedural
safeguards.’ . . . Any ambiguities in the record concerning the
agreement’s terms are resolved in the defendant’s favor.

Doe I, 430 Md. at 576, 62 A.3d at 147 (Harrell, J., concurring) (quoting Cuffley, 416
Md. at 580-81, 7 A.3d at 563-65). Judge Harrell reiterated his stance in a
concurrence in Doe II. See Doe II, 439 Md. at 238, 94 A.3d at 813 (Harrell, J.,
concurring).
102
Doe I, 430 Md. at 569, 62 A.3d at 143 (Harrell, J., concurring).
103
See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
104
See e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) (holding that prior
criminal conduct serves solely an evidentiary purpose to demonstrate “mental
abnormality” or to support a finding of future dangerousness to invoke involuntary
commitment under Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act); see also Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s retroactive sex offender
registration statute did not constitute punishment sufficient to sustain a challenge
under the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution).
105
See Howard, supra note 9.
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nonpunitive in nature,106 following the lead of the state’s supreme court.107
Numerous state courts have agreed with this analysis.108
It is clear that under Smith’s controlling precedent on the federal ex post
facto issue, federal judges have little, if any, substantive leeway to grant relief
to registrants in federal courts.109 However, just as there have been substantive
losses for registrants challenging their sex offender registration obligation on
ex post facto grounds in federal courts,110 there have been instances of
procedural wins.111
State high courts, however, have both substantive and procedural leeway to
strike down registration schemes offensive to their respective state
constitutions.112 Alaska, Indiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Maine, Missouri, and
Kentucky are included among other states that have declared their registry
schemes to constitute ex post facto violations, independent of the federal
constitutional provision, affording broader protection on state constitutional
grounds as did a plurality of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe I.113
The Supreme Court of Alaska, notwithstanding the Supreme Court of the
United States’ holding in Smith v. Doe and its concession that it has on several
106

Cunningham v. Lemmon, 251 Fed.Appx. 829, 830 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(no ex post facto violation on federal constitutional grounds), aff’g Cunningham v.
West Virginia, No. 6:06-cv-00169, 2007 WL 895866, at *7 (D. W. Va. Mar. 22,
2007).
107
See Haislop v. Edgell, 215 W.Va. 88, 95, 593 S.E.2d 839, 846 (2003) (no ex post
facto violation on state constitutional grounds).
108
See Howard, supra note 9.
109
See Doe I, 430 Md. at 556-57, 62 A.3d 123, 135-36 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84 (2003)); supra text accompanying note 60. The analysis in Smith may,
however, produce a different result where a registrant meets the “clearest proof”
burden under registration schemes more punitive than Alaska’s.
110
See, e.g., United States v. Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 958 (9th Cir. 2013) (criminal
prosecution valid for failure to register retroactively under SORNA); United States v.
Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1045 n.7 (9th Cir. 2012) (Sixth Circuit citing authority for no
ex post facto violation for pre-SORNA retroactive registration and Ninth Circuit
holding same).
111
See generally United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2013) (outlining
circuit split on whether the Attorney General had good cause to bypass the
Administrative Procedure Act notice and comment period on interim retroactivity
rule, holding that he did not, thereby prejudicing plaintiff); United States v.
Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the same).
112
See Doe I, 430 Md. at 549, 62 A.3d at 131; supra text accompanying note 68.
113
See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1003 (Alaska 2008) (utilizing federal intenteffects test); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. 2009) (utilizing federal
intent-effects test); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ohio 2011) (utilizing
unique Ohio ex post facto test); Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1019
(Okla. 2013) (intent-effects test); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 16 (Me. 2009)
(federal intent-effects test); Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006) (utilizing
state constitutional bar on “laws retrospective in operation”).
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occasions followed the federal constitutional ex post facto analysis, later
extended broader protection on state constitutional grounds where Alaska’s
statutory scheme “treats offenders not much differently than the state treats
probationers and parolees subject to continued state supervision.”114 The court
ultimately held that the effects of the statute “are punitive, and convincingly
outweigh the statute's nonpunitive purposes and effects.”115 Likewise, in
Wallace, the Supreme Court of Indiana found that despite the Indiana
legislature’s civil intent, the punitive effects of Indiana’s sex offender
registration statute were particularly excessive.116 The Supreme Court of
Ohio, utilizing an ex post facto test from the turn of the twentieth century,
found that the punitive effect of the state’s sex offender registration statute
impermissibly “takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right,
imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a
past transaction, or creates a new right.”117
II. RESIDUAL DISPUTE AND THE PROBLEM IN MARYLAND TODAY
At the federal level, the current bottleneck in the retroactive operation of
Maryland and other states’ sex offender registration statutes illustrates a
problem for the Attorney General in applying SORNA retroactively as a
national standard.118 Maryland is now among several states that have declared
retroactive sex offender registration obligations unconstitutional as punitive
based upon state ex post facto prohibitions.119 The decision initially opened
the floodgates to challenges by offenders required to register because of
antecedent convictions. Serving to delay this result, the Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services, the administrator of Maryland’s sex offender
registration system, initially resisted the decision of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Doe I, and appellate litigation continued.120

114

Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1009. The court applied the seven Mendoza-Martinez
ex post facto factors applied in Smith, noting the intrusive practical effects of the
scheme, which threatens prosecution for non-compliance. See id. at 1008 (citing
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
115
Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1018.
116
Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384.
117
Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1110-11 (quoting Pratte v. Stewart, 929 N.E.2d 415, at
37 (Ohio 2010)).
118
Ostensibly, the Attorney General anticipated states’ ex post facto analyses to be
consistent with the prevailing federal intent-effects analysis in all cases (an
obviously flawed assumption). See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
119
See supra text accompanying note 113. State constitutionality rulings, of course,
inherently vary depending upon the various language in and interpretations of state
constitutions and the degree of each states’ retroactive registration obligations, many
of which have been inspired by the federal SORNA standards.
120
See infra Part II.a-c.
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The residual problem in Maryland following Doe I was apparent in the form
of a federalism problem in part and a statutory construction problem in part in
Roe v. Maynard (Roe),121 and was a certified question of law in Doe II.122
Following the plurality decision in Doe I,123 the Circuit Court for Washington
County entered an order directing the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services to remove Mr. Doe’s registration information from state
and federal databases.124 The Department resisted this order, claiming that the
court lacked authority to remove offender information from federal
databases.125 The Department appealed the denial of its motion to alter or
amend the order on that ground, and the court of special appeals certified that
question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland pursuant to Rule 8-304.126 A
similar question was raised in a separate case occurring at the same time as the
Doe I litigation, and the matters were consolidated for argument in the Court
of Appeals of Maryland in May 2014.127
A. The Roe Case
John Roe was similarly affected by the 2009-10 amendments to Maryland’s
registration statute as a result of a conviction in 1997, for offenses committed
between late 1994 and early 1996.128 As a result of the amendments, Roe’s
original ten-year registration obligation was retroactively converted into a
twenty-five-year obligation under the new tier system.129 Roe filed a
complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Maryland for
Wicomico County following the legislature’s passage of the 2009
amendments.130 He challenged his retroactive registration obligation in part
on federal and state ex post facto grounds, but the circuit court denied relief.131
He appealed the denial to the court of special appeals, which ultimately
reversed the circuit court pursuant to the Doe I plurality, holding that the 2009

121

Roe v. Maynard, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947 (2013).
See Doe II, 439 Md. at 222, 94 A.3d 791, 803.
123
See supra Part I.d.
124
See Doe II, 439 Md. at 210, 94 A.3d at 796.
125
Id.
126
Id.; see also State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 3.
127
The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services successfully
petitioned for certiorari in Roe in the Court of Appeals of Maryland shortly after Doe
was decided. See infra Part II.c. See also State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at
17.
128
Doe II, 439 Md. at 211-12, 94 A.3d at 797.
129
Id. at 212-13, 94 A.3d at 797-98 (If not for the 2010 amendment, the 2009
amendment reclassifying Mr. Roe would have required him to register for life.).
130
Id. Roe had already spent 13 years as a registered sex offender. See also Roe v.
Maynard, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947 (2013).
131
Doe II, 439 Md. at 212, 94 A.3d at 797.
122
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and 2010 amendments could not be applied retroactively.132 The Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services then appealed from the subsequent
order of the circuit court for Wicomico County that had ordered it, as it had in
Doe I, to “remove any and all information regarding Roe from the Maryland
Sex Offender Registry website [and] . . . remove Roe’s sex offender
registration information from all federal databases including the NCIC . . .
.”133 The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted the Department’s certiorari
petition and consolidated the question for oral argument with that which was
posed in Doe I134 to consider whether the circuit court had authority to direct
the Department to remove Roe from databases maintained in compliance with
federal law.135
B. Doe’s Ex Post Facto Analysis is the Law of Maryland
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe II did not revisit the ex post facto
analysis articulated by the Doe I plurality.136 The Department argued in its
petition for certiorari that because the Doe I plurality relied upon the
“disadvantage” analysis in reaching its result while two other judges on the
court reached the same result in using the intent-effect analysis, Doe I “has
generated uncertainty with regard to the registration obligations of thousands
of Maryland sex offenders.”137 It further argued that Doe I should be
reconsidered to bring Maryland in line with the Supreme Court’s result in
Smith.138 Strength for this argument was apparent because a majority of the

132

Id. at 213, 94 A.3d at 798.
Id. The Circuit Court for Wicomico County did not address the Department’s
motion for appropriate relief, seeking to have the court declare Roe’s registration
obligation under federal law, prior to entering its order. However, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland treated it as denied, making it a final, appealable order. Id. at
215, 94 A.3d at 799.
134
Id. at 207 n.1, 94 A.3d at 794 n.1.
135
Id. at 207, 94 A.3d at 794.
136
Doe II, 439 Md. at 214 n.8, 94 A.3d at 798 n.8.
137
State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 8-9. Mr. Roe, in his response to the
Department’s certiorari petition, called this a “back-door effort” on the part of the
Department “to raise issues it failed to raise or preserve in Mr. Roe’s case . . . before
the Circuit Court . . . .” Appellee’s Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1,
Roe v. Maynard, 435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 947 (2013) (No. 125), 2012 WL 3791643
[hereinafter Roe Response].
138
State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 9-10. The practical effect of this would
have been to narrow the ex post facto protections under Maryland’s constitution
despite Article 17’s broader language than the Federal constitution’s ex post facto
prohibition. By presenting a favorable question of federal law for review, the
Department ostensibly strategized to persuade the Court of Appeals to reconsider
Doe I in its favor. The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with the
characterization of this as an attempt at “backdoor preemption” – the Department’s
133

182

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 45.2

judges that took part in the Doe I decision favored reading Article 17 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights in pari materia with the federal Constitution’s
ex post facto prohibition using the intent-effects test.139 However, in granting
certiorari in Roe and accepting the certified question in Doe I, the court limited
its review in Doe II to the independent registration obligation under federal
law and the Maryland courts’ ability to order removal of offenders from
federal databases.140 The court did not accept the Department’s question of
whether Maryland’s registration requirements are considered punishment for
purposes of the federal and State ex post facto prohibitions.141
C. The Independent Federal Registration Obligation: A Matter of
Statutory Interpretation
The basis of the Department’s position following the Doe I plurality was
that, irrespective of the constitutionality of Maryland’s sex offender
registration statute, federal law imposes an independent obligation upon
offenders to register in Maryland. Therefore, convicted offenders in Mr. Roe
and Mr. Doe’s position must remain listed in “federal databases.”142 The Court
of Appeals of Maryland addressed this argument head on in Doe II.143 The
questions resolved by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe II included
whether:
In light of the requirement imposed by federal law that each
state maintain an online registry of sex offenders residing in
the state and the obligation imposed on convicted sex
offenders by federal law to register in the state where they
reside, . . . the circuit court lack[ed] authority to direct the
State to remove Mr. Roe from databases maintained in

attempt at “us[ing] federal law to effectively override [its] decision in Doe I.” See
Doe II, 439 Md. at 221 n.11, 94 A.3d at 802 n.11.
139
State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 9-10.
140
Doe II, 439 Md. at 220-21, 94 A.3d at 802-03.
141
Id. at 214 n.8, 94 A.3d at 798 n.8. Though the Court did not grant certiorari
regarding revisiting Doe, the Department did not fully abandon these arguments
during oral argument.
142
State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 17. Federal law, the Department’s
argument continued, precluded Maryland courts’ authority to order the Department
to remove sex offender information from “federal databases.” Doe II, 439 Md. at
219-20, 94 A.3d at 802.
143
Doe II, 439 Md. at 207, 94 A.3d at 794. The Maynard v. Roe portion of the
consolidated opinion was re-captioned as Hershberger v. Roe after Gregg
Hershberger succeeded Gary Maynard as Secretary of the Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services. Id. at 207 n.1, 94 A.3d at 794 n.1.
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compliance with federal law, irrespective of his challenge to
registration requirements imposed by MD law?144
The question was essentially the same in Doe I.145
The court of appeals in Doe II eschewed Mr. Roe’s constitutional
arguments and resolved the issues solely by statutory interpretation.146 The
court expressly declined the constitutional arguments, thereby limiting the
grounds for its holding on the independent federal registration obligation
issue.147
The Attorney General’s final guidelines provide guidance on sex offenders’
federal obligation:
SORNA’s regulatory system for sex offenders involves a
combination of federal and non-federal elements. In part,
SORNA directly prescribes registration requirements that sex
offenders must comply with, and authorizes the Attorney
General to augment or further specify those requirements in
certain areas. . . . These requirements are subject to direct
federal enforcement, including prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
2250 where violations occur under circumstances supporting
federal jurisdiction, and prescription of compliance with the
SORNA requirements as mandatory conditions of supervision
for federal sex offenders under 18 U.S.C. 3563(a)(8), 3583(d).
SORNA provides incentives for states and other covered
jurisdictions to incorporate its registration requirements for
sex offenders, and other registration and notification-related
measures set out in other provisions of SORNA, into their
own sex offender registration notification programs.148

144

Id. at 214, 94 A.3d at 798.
Id. at 211, 94 A.3d at 796. The modified certified question considered in Doe II
was whether “circuit courts have the authority to order the Department to remove sex
offender registration information from ‘federal databases’?” See id.
146
Id. at 221-22, 94 A.3d at 802-03. Mr. Roe argued that SORNA was merely an
exercise of the Spending Clause to encourage states’ implementation of SORNA to
avoid losing federal grant funds under the Edward R. Byrne Justice Assistance
Grant. See Roe Response, supra note 137, at 18-22. He further argued that any
federal government regulation of Maryland’s sex offender registration system clearly
exceeds Congress’ commerce power and that Congress cannot compel Mr. Roe to
register in Maryland as a sex offender notwithstanding the Doe plurality holding.
Doe II, 439 Md. at 220-21, 94 A.3d at 802-03.
147
Doe II, 439 Md. at 221-22, 94 A.3d at 802-03.
148
2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38034.
145
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The Second Circuit interpreted the independent federal registration
obligation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a)149 in United States v. Guzman.150
Guzman involved federal criminal enforcement of offenders who failed to
register, then subsequently traveled in interstate commerce.151 In Guzman, the
court acknowledged that “according to [section 2250’s] explicit terms, a sex
offender who never crosses state lines . . . cannot be criminally liable [under
section 2250] for failure to comply with SORNA.”152 The Fourth Circuit
rejected another Commerce Clause challenge to SORNA enforcement in
United States v. Gould,153 upholding a Maryland sex offender’s federal
149

Section 16913(a) provides:
A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each
jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee,
and where the offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a
sex offender shall also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such
jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction of residence.

42 U.S.C. § 16913(a)
150
591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied 561 U.S. 1019 (2010).
151
Id. The federal criminal enforcement provision provides:
(a) In general. Whoever-(1) is required to register under the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act;
(2)
(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes
of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act by reason of a conviction under
Federal law (including the Uniform Code of
Military Justice [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.]), the
law of the District of Columbia, Indian tribal
law, or the law of any territory or possession of
the United States; or
(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or
enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country;
and
(3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as
required by the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
152
Guzman, 591 F.3d at 90. In so holding, the Second Circuit noted that it joined
“every other circuit that has examined the issue in concluding that 18 U.S.C. §
2250(a) is a legitimate exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority.” Id.
(citations omitted).
153
568 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 559 U.S. 974 (2010).
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conviction as a valid exercise of the federal government’s commerce power,
and not an ex post facto violation where the defendant was convicted under
section 2250 following an antecedent District of Columbia conviction and
failure to register upon moving to Maryland.154 Gould clearly illustrates the
operation of section 16913(a)’s mandate on offenders in the context of its
criminal enforcement by section 2250(a), where federal jurisdiction exists.
However, Guzman and Gould can easily be distinguished from the issue
before the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Doe II because neither Mr. Roe
nor Mr. Doe had been convicted “under Federal law[], the law of the District
of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory of possession of the
United States . . . [,]” nor had they “travel[ed] in interstate or foreign
commerce[,]” either of which would subject them to federal criminal liability
for failure to register under section 2250.155 Moreover, as the court of appeals
pointed out, these and other cases on which the Department relied serve to only
affirm the notion that section 16913(a)’s mandate on individual offenders
operated regardless of whether the state in which the offender was located had
implemented SORNA.156 This was irrelevant to the resolution of the issues in
Doe II.157
Despite the absence of facts to support federal jurisdiction for purposes of
federal criminal enforcement in Roe or Doe I, Guzman and Gould do support
the Department’s position that 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913(a) imposes a federal law
obligation on sex offenders convicted in Maryland to register based upon their

Id. This was even prior to Maryland’s implementation of SORNA standards.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Mr. Roe also raised this point in his response to the
Department’s certiorari petition in his case. See Roe Response, supra note 137, at 8.
156
Doe II, 439 Md. at 227-28, 94 A.3d at 807.
157
The Doe II court stated:
154
155

What the [Department] fails to recognize . . . is the distinguishing
fact that in those federal cases, the purported obstacle to
registration was that Maryland had not yet implemented SORNA.
By contrast, here Appellees’ asserted stumbling block is that this
Court has declared the retroactive application of Maryland’s sex
offender registry to be unconstitutional under the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.” Id. “[A]lthough . . . SORNA creates a
direct obligation on sex offenders to register in their home state,
independent of that State’s implementation of SORNA, the state
need not accept the registration if doing so would be contrary to
state law. This is precisely the case here. The [Department]
cannot legally accept a sex offender’s involuntary registration
when that individual’s registration is unconstitutional under
Maryland law.
Id. at 232, 94 A.3d at 809.
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status as sex offenders set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 16911.158 The Department
cited a decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri, which held that SORNA
requires Missouri officials to maintain offenders on the state’s registry
pursuant to section 16913 “irrespective of any allegedly retrospective state law
that has been enacted and may be subject to [the Missouri constitution’s] ban
on the enactment of retrospective state laws.”159 However, the Supreme Court
of Missouri later qualified its holding in Keathley, explaining that SORNA’s
independent registration obligation in section 16913(a) merely triggered the
registration obligation by operation of Missouri statute, meaning that Missouri
may require an offender to register based on section 16913(a)’s mandate
without violating its state constitution.160
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the Department’s preemption
argument, noting that “the federal statute itself does not purport to ‘preempt
the field’ of sex offender registration . . . [,]” and that the Attorney General’s
regulations explain that SORNA does not preempt state sex offender
registration schemes.161 Therefore, absent a constitutionally-valid, state-level
criminal enforcement option, enforcement of this federal obligation is limited
to circumstances supporting federal jurisdiction, including traveling in
interstate commerce.162 It follows that a state could theoretically choose to
eliminate its sex offender registration statutes entirely, leaving no enforcement
option for failure to register under the federal mandate.163 Further, there can
be no intrastate criminal enforcement of this independent retroactive federal
obligation to register, provided that offenders in Mr. Roe’s and Mr. Doe’s
158

See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81849-01, at
81850 (Dec. 29, 2000) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.72) (“SORNA directly imposes
registration obligations on sex offenders as a matter of federal law and provides for
federal enforcement of these obligations under circumstances supporting federal
jurisdiction.”); see also Doe II, 439 Md. at 227-28, 94 A.3d at 806-07.
159
Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Mo. 2009) (necessitating the assumption
that Missouri has a registry in the first place). Missouri is of course, like any state,
free to decide whether to maintain a sex offender registration program at all.
Ostensibly on this basis, the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that “the federal
statute itself does not purport to ‘preempt the field’ of sex offender registration . . .”
Doe II, 439 Md. at 221 n.11, 94 A.3d at 802 n.11.
160
Doe II, 439 Md. at 233, 94 A.3d at 810 (citing Doe v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165,
167 (Mo. 2012) (internal citations omitted)).
161
Doe II, at 221 n.11, 94 A.3d at 802 n.11.
162
See Roe Response, supra note 137 at 23-24 (citing Carr v. United States, 560 U.S.
438, 452 (2010)); see also Guzman, 591 F.3d at 90 (“[W]ithout § 2250, § 16913
lacks federal criminal enforcement, and without § 16913, § 2250 has no substance.”).
163
As a practical matter, SORNA’s independent obligation to register depends on a
state’s enactment and implementation of a sex offender registry in the first place.
Indeed, there would be no point in SORNA’s requirement that states adopt separate
state-level criminal penalties for failure to register if the federal criminal liability for
failure to register pursuant to SORNA could reach purely intrastate activity. See 42
U.S.C. § 16913(e) (2006).
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situation do not subject themselves to federal criminal enforcement by
traveling in interstate commerce or becoming convicted in a manner
conferring federal jurisdiction.164
The Department further argued that:
[P]recluding [offenders] from complying with [their] federal
obligation to register in [their] place of residence under 42
U.S.C. § 16913(a)[,] . . . frustrates the purpose of SORNA to
protect children from child sex offenders and creates a
situation where Maryland will become a ‘sanctuary state’ for
child sex offenders attempting to escape the federal statute’s
registration requirements.165
It is now apparent that this policy argument carries weight only to the extent
that Maryland offenders removed from the State’s registry pursuant to Doe I
do not leave the state. Any out-of-state offenders moving to Maryland in an
attempt to avoid registration requirements will be subject to federal criminal
liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2250.166
Whether or not the Department’s argument is true, the court of appeals did
not reach this issue in Doe II. The court of appeals read the SORNA statutory
provisions as a whole167 to hold that, despite SORNA’s “independent federal
registration obligation,” Maryland circuit courts are authorized to direct state
officials to remove Maryland sex offender registrants from the State’s registry
when the offenders were placed on the registry illegally under Doe I.168 This
highlights the Department’s recent dilemma: relieve the State’s existing
retroactive class as a whole from their existing registration requirements or
evaluate each individual offender’s challenge in a wave of litigation following
Doe I and Doe II?
D. Substantial Implementation
Congress expressly contemplated state-level constitutionality problems,
providing that the Attorney General, in the face of such a problem, must
consult with the state’s chief executive and chief legal officer to determine
“reasonable alternative procedures or accommodations . . . consistent with the
purposes of this chapter” in determining whether the state has substantially
implemented SORNA, thereby potentially preserving states’ entitlement to
164

See Guzman, 591 F.3d 83; supra text accompanying note 151.
See State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 15.
166
See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 464 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a sex
offenders’ registration obligation is not contingent upon SORNA implementation).
167
See Doe II, 439 Md. at 229, 94 A.3d at 807 (citing Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 9,
20 A.3d 801, 806 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted).
168
Doe II, 439 Md. at 206, 231, 94 A.3d at 794, 808.
165
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grant awards.169
The Attorney General, in implementing SORNA
retroactively, expressly recognized the states’ authority to declare their
SORNA-inspired registration statutes unconstitutional on state constitutional
grounds, specifically as a result of the retroactivity aspect of the SORNA
guidelines.170 However, in response to comments he received on SORNA’s
retroactivity, the Attorney General ostensibly anticipated no ex post facto
problems based upon the Supreme Court’s determination in Smith v. Doe in
stating, perhaps not controversially at the time, that:
[A]s non-punitive regulatory measures, the SORNA
requirements do not implicate the Constitution's prohibition
of ex post facto laws. Moreover, fairness does not require that
an offender, at the time he acknowledges his commission of
the crime and pleads guilty, be able to anticipate all future
regulatory measures that may be adopted in relation to persons
like him for public safety purposes.171
Given that section 16925 expressly contemplates a mechanism to preserve
states’ substantial implementation in the face of state constitutionality
problems, it is not the case, as the Department argued, that “these federal
obligations operate independently of state law and of any judicial
determination that state law registration requirements cannot be applied to Mr.
Roe.”172
Therefore, it is clearly the case that Maryland’s obligation to “maintain
[individuals] on its sex offender registry” only affects substantial
implementation of SORNA and its attendant retention of federal grant funds
in support of SORNA’s purpose to bolster nationwide network of
registrants.173 Having considered the issue of offenders’ independent federal
169

Id. at 230, 94 A.3d at 808 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16925 (b)).
See 2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38036.
171
Id. This certainly conflicts with the policy rationale underlying plea agreements.
See Doe I, 430 Md. at 576, 62 A.3d at 147; supra text accompanying note 101.
172
State Certiorari Petition, supra note 6, at 17; see also Doe II, 439 Md. at 231, 94
A.3d at 808 (“To arrive at the [Department]’s proposed interpretation of the statute –
that Appellees must register in Maryland even if doing so violates their rights under
Maryland’s constitution – would render SORNA § 125, 42 U.S.C. § 16925, useless
surplusage.”).
173
See Doe II, 439 Md. at 223, 94 A.3d at 804 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16925(d)); see
also supra note 22 and accompanying text; Roe Response, supra note 137, at 18-26;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Sex Offender Registration and Notification in the
United States: Current Case Law and Issues, at 6 n.32 (Sept. 2014), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/caselaw/handbook_july2012.pdf (“Federal courts
have interpreted SORNA as directly imposing a duty on a person to attempt to
register if they meet the definition of ‘sex offender’ under SORNA. [But,] there will
be situations where . . . the jurisdiction where that offender lives . . . refuses to
170
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obligation to register pursuant to SORNA’s express terms and states’
obligations to substantially implement SORNA’s standards only to avoid
federal grant funding reduction, the next issue the court of appeals considered
was the question of the ability of Maryland courts to remove offenders from
“federal databases.”
E. Removal from “Federal” Databases?
Pursuant to Doe I, the circuit courts for Washington County and Wicomico
County directed the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services to
remove Mr. Doe and Mr. Roe’s information from Maryland’s sex offender
registration databases and website as well as “all federal databases including
the NCIC.”174 Mr. Roe, in his response to the Department’s opposition to these
orders, was partially correct to point out that there is no “federal registry.” 175
There is in fact no public federal sex offender registry—a nationwide
collection of sex offender registration information is maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for law enforcement purposes only.176 These records,
maintained as a component of the FBI’s National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) database, are available to criminal justice agencies nationwide, which
themselves enter the records.177 This compilation of sex offender registration
information is not publicly available. Since “NCIC policy requires the
inquiring agency to make contact with the entering agency to verify the
information is accurate and up-to-date[,] the agency where sex offender
registration was initiated would be responsible for the updating and removal
of that information from the NCIC.”178
Because the federal government by way of SORNA does not, and cannot,
preempt the field of sex offender registration,179 the public national sex
register him, because the jurisdiction’s laws do not require registration for the
offense of conviction.”)
174
Doe II, 439 Md. at 210, 213, 94 A.3d at 796-98.
175
Roe Response, supra note 137, at 18.
176
The Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 14072, originally directed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to establish a
national law enforcement database (the National Sex Offender Registry or “NSOR”)
to track certain violent classes of sex offenders and those offenders convicted of an
offense against a minor victim. See Doe II, 439 Md.at 235-36, 94 A.3d at 811; 2008
Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38032-33. Although § 14072 has been repealed,
SORNA continued the FBI’s National Sex Offender Registry intended for use by law
enforcement only by incorporating the NSOR into the FBI’s National Crime
Information Center (NCIC). Doe II, 439 Md. at 235-36, 94 A.3d at 811; see also 42
U.S.C. § 16919(a) (2013).
177
Doe II, 439 Md. at 235-36, 94 A.3d at 811 (citing FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, National Crime Information Center, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ncic/ncic (last visited July 6, 2014)).
178
Doe II, 439 Md. at 236, 94 A.3d at 811-12 (internal quotations omitted).
179
See infra Part II.c.
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offender registry is not a centralized database or registry at all. The federal
Dru Sjodin National Sex offender Public Website (NSOPW) provides that:
NSOPW [does not] have a single national database of all
registered sex offenders from the registry Jurisdictions that
participate with NSOPW[.] NSOPW primarily uses Web
services to search the individual databases of the Jurisdictions
in real time when a search is conducted.180
The Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services has the
responsibility to maintain, manage, and authorize termination of entries in the
State’s central sex offender registry and to exchange information with federal
agencies.181 Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that Maryland officials,
by virtue of removing offenders from Maryland’s registry, also remove
offender information from the NCIC database and NSOPW “search engine”
results, eliminating law enforcement’s and the public’s ability to search for
removed offenders at both the federal and state level.182 This indeed is a
critical component of the alleviation of public shaming and shunning concerns
expressed by the court of appeals in Doe I and by amicus.183
The court of appeals reviewed the language and scope of the court orders
that directed the Department to remove offender information from state and
federal databases.184 The court of appeals determined that the circuit courts’
orders in Mr. Doe and Mr. Roe’s cases were incorrect to the extent they
ordered the Department to directly remove their information from “federal
databases.”185 In so doing, the court, recognizing that removal from Maryland
databases should in due course result in removal of the information from
federal “databases,” instructed the court of special appeals to order the
Department on remand only to “[r]emove any and all [offender] information .
. . from the Maryland Sex Offender Registry website and any additional
database(s) where the State has published such information, and notify all
relevant federal agencies of the removal of Doe's information from Maryland's
registry.”186
180

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Frequently Asked Questions: Using the NSOPW,
http://www.nsopr.gov/en/Home/FAQ#answer-09 (last visited July 11, 2014).
181
Doe II, 439 Md.at 237, 94 A.3d at 812 (citing MD. CODE REGS. 12.06.01.01-.18,
12.06.01.08).
182
Doe II, 439 Md. at 237, 94 A.3d at 812.
183
See supra notes 87, 89-90 and accompanying text.
184
Doe II, 439 Md. at 213, 94 A.3d at 798.
185
Id. at 237-38, 94 A.3d at 812. SORNA requires registering agencies and law
enforcement entities to submit the information necessary to populate the National
Sex Offender Registry Database utilized by law enforcement. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, supra note 173, at 3.
186
Doe II, 439 Md. at 238, 94 A.3d at 812-13. As of November 1, 2014 DPSCS has
begun the process of removing over 850 offenders from the State’s registry, and is
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III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
It is now clear that the Maryland constitution and the recent Court of
Appeals of Maryland rulings preclude retroactive sex offender registration in
Maryland, whether or not the State seeks to maintain substantial
implementation of SORNA’s requirements. Maryland is by no means alone
in its historical struggle to substantially implement SORNA in pursuit of an
important and just public policy in protecting minors, victims, and potential
victims from violent sex offenders. However, using SORNA’s federal
standards as the focal point, most states have still failed to implement SORNA
for a variety of reasons including state constitutionality problems, resistance
to juvenile registration components, political will, and ex post facto
retroactivity issues.187 Indeed, the Attorney General’s retroactivity analysis
has proven to be fundamentally incompatible with an apparently growing
number of states covered by SORNA.188 Below are some potential
possibilities for Maryland to consider in legislating and administering
reviewing still more, following the Court of Appeals ruling in Doe II in June 2014.
See DPSCS Press Release: DPSCS begins removing offenders from Sex Offender
Registry after the June Court of Appeals Ruling (Aug. 12, 2014), available at
http://news.maryland.gov/dpscs/ 2014/08/12/dpscs-begins-removing-offenders-fromsex-offender-registry-after-june-court-of-appeals-ruling/; Ian Duncan, Sun
Investigates Court ruling upends Maryland's sex offender registry, BALTIMORE SUN
(November 1, 2014) http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-sexoffenders-20141101-story.html#page=1; A Shrinking Registry, BALTIMORE SUN
(October 31, 2014, 4:11 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bal-sex-offender-registrygraphic-10-31-2014-htmlstory.html.
187
As of April 2015, only 17 states, three territories, and 83 Indian tribes have
substantially implemented SORNA. The final deadline following an extension was
July 27, 2011. See Jurisdictions that have substantially implemented SORNA,
available at http://www.smart.gov/newsroom_jurisdictions
_sorna.htm (last accessed April 8, 2015); Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act: Compliance news, NCSL, available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/
civil-and-criminal-justice/adam-walsh-child-protection-and-safety-act.aspx (last
accessed Dec. 18, 2014); Search Survey on State Compliance with the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) (April 2009) available at
http://www.search.org/files/pdf/SORNA-StateComplianceSurvey2009.pdf (listing
state-by-state reasons for failure to comply with SORNA). This is a reduction from
November 2012, at which time 19 of 56 jurisdictions had substantially implemented
SORNA. SEE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Report to
the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act:
Jurisdictions Face Challenges to Implementing the Act, and Stakeholders Report
Positive and Negative Effects, at 13 (Feb. 2013) available at
http://www.oregonlive.com/sexoffenders/specialpresentation/media/GAOsexoffenderFeb.2013reportSORNA.pdf.
188
See infra Part III.a.
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Maryland’s sex offender registration scheme moving forward in the wake of
Doe I and Doe II.
A. Should Maryland Abandon Substantial Implementation?
Many states face fiscal barriers and insufficient incentive to pursuing
substantial implementation.189 Several states have publicly reported that the
cost of substantially implementing SORNA is much greater than the cost of
losing ten percent of its Byrne grant funds.190 For example, California officials
have recommended that the state not pursue compliance with SORNA and
instead “absorb the comparatively small loss of federal funds that would result
from not accepting the very costly and ill-advised changes to state law and
policy required by the [Adam Walsh] Act.”191 Similarly, Texas officials
recently estimated that it would cost 38.7 million dollars to comply with
SORNA, while the state would only lose 1.4 million dollars for failing to
comply.192 In addition to fiscal considerations, Texas officials also expressed
concern that SORNA’s offense-based classification system would improperly
classify offenders and undermine the state’s work to individually assess
offender risk in order to “narrow the sex offender registry to those who are
most likely to be dangerous.”193
Colorado’s Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB) also recommended
that the state not implement the requirements of SORNA, in part based upon
a lack of evidence suggesting the effectiveness of SORNA’s standards.194

189

See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., What Will it Cost States to Comply with the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act?, available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_FAC_SORNACosts_JJ.pdf (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014).
190
Id.
191
See STATE OF CAL. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., Adam Walsh Act Statement of
Position, 1-2 (2014), http://www.casomb.org/docs/Adam%20Walsh%20Position
%20Paper.pdf. California elected to adopt a system assigning risk levels to
individual offenders via actuarial risk assessment instruments as opposed to
SORNA’s offense-based tier system. Id. at 2.
192
Donna Lyons, Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire: June 2011, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/sex-offender-law-down-to-the-wire.aspx#clash (last visited Dec. 18,
2014).
193
Id. Similarly, “develop[ing] criteria for measuring a person's risk of reoffending
to assist the court in determining whether a person may be appropriately released
from [lifetime] supervision [pursuant to Maryland’s registration statute]” and
“review[ing] the laws and practices of other states and jurisdictions concerning
sexual offenders” are two of the tasks assigned to Maryland’s Sex Offender
Advisory Board. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 1-401(g)(1) (2014).
194
See COLO. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., White Paper on the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 4 (September 2008), available at
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However, the SOMB recommended some compromise, including “supporting
efforts to enhance inter-jurisdictional communications relative to registrants”
and continued participation in the law enforcement National Sex Offender
Registry maintained by the FBI.195 Florida, too, has published virtually
identical concerns with respect to its compliance with SORNA, noting that
“[the Adam Walsh Act] has generated significant debate and controversy.” 196
Maine legislators also published a report with recommendations for a
combination risk and offense-based revision of the state’s registration laws
following the supreme judicial court’s finding in Letalien.197
B. Fiscal Considerations in Implementation
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has pointed out the
difficulty in assessing the cost of failing to implement SORNA based upon
fluctuations in federal funding “during a time of deep recession and overall
revenue and spending reductions.”198 In 2009, the exact cost of implementing
SORNA-mandated retroactive registration in Maryland was unknown. At that
time the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services preliminarily
projected the need to hire additional agents to supervise this retroactive class
of offenders at an annual cost of $1,600 per offender and $50,000 in salary per
new agent required for these low offender-agent ratios and specialized
caseloads.199
Assuming conservatively that supervising Maryland’s
retroactive class of approximately 1,250 offenders at a 1:15 agent to offender
caseload ratio, this amounts to a cost of approximately 6.2 million dollars to
supervise this population based upon those financial estimates.200 By the
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/AWA_Information/AWA_Colorado_SOMB_White%20Pa
per.pdf, for a discussion of this and other noted conflicts.
195
Id. Maryland’s Sex Offender Advisory Board is also mandated to “consider ways
to increase cooperation among states with regard to sexual offender registration and
monitoring.” See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 1-401(g)(8).
196
See THE FL. SENATE, Issue Brief 2009-312: Fiscal, Policy, and Legal
Considerations Regarding State Compliance with the Adam Walsh Act, 1 (Oct.
2008), http://www.ovsom.texas.gov/docs/Florida-Fiscal-Legal-ConsiderationsAWA-2008.pdf.
197
See State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 16 (Me. 2009); supra text accompanying note
113; see also FINAL REP. OF THE CRIM. JUSTICE & PUB. SAFETY COMM., STUDY OF
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS, 123d Leg., 2d Sess., at 18 (Me. Nov. 2008),
available at http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/sexoffender2008report.pdf
(recommending in part a revision that does not strictly adhere to SORNA’s
standards).
198
Cost-Benefit Analyses of SORNA Implementation, NCSL,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/cost-benefit-analyses-ofsorna-implementation.aspx (last visited Jul. 7, 2014).
199
See Fiscal Note to S.B. 425 (Revised), 426th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Md.
2009) (enacted as 2009 Md. Laws, ch. 541).
200
See id.
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NCSL’s calculation, in Fiscal Year 2012 Maryland would have lost only
$622,500 of its $6,225,000 in Byrne funds for failure to substantially
implement SORNA.201 As has been the experience of other states, it is very
likely true that other costs associated with maintaining SORNA
implementation in Maryland well exceed the loss of its Byrne funding.202 The
cost to capture and supervise this retroactive class has proven to be
substantially out of proportion with the grant funds allocated for this and other
purposes.
Given the constitutionality issue under Maryland’s ex post facto
constitutional prohibition, the costs of implementation experienced by
Maryland and other states,203 and uncertain public safety benefits of SORNA
implementation, Maryland regulators and lawmakers should consider
abandoning efforts to substantially implement SORNA and carefully
reevaluate sex offender registration requirements to ensure that only high-risk,
dangerous offenders are required to register moving forward.204 Maryland is
currently presented with this opportunity.
The Maryland Sexual Offender Advisory Board, formed in 2006, has
existed prior to SORNA’s substantial implementation deadlines, and is an
existing vehicle for such change.205 Although initially finding that the State’s
compliance with SORNA has bolstered Maryland’s ability to “more accurately
track and register convicted sex offenders, and to increase information sharing
among jurisdictions[,]”206 the Board has more recently drafted legislation that
would permit discharge of lifetime registrants from their lifetime registration

201

See SORNA Noncompliance Penalties, NCSL, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cj/jagstatedollars.pdf. This is not to
undermine the importance of Byrne funding to Maryland communities and a wide
variety of Maryland criminal justice efforts it supports. See also GOVERNOR’S
OFFICE OF CRIME CONTROL & PREVENTION, FY 2014 Edward J. Byrne Memorial
Justice Assistance (BJAG) Grant – Notice of Funding Available (NOFA) Application
Guidance Kit, at 2-3, http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/grants/
2014/bjag/BJAG%20NOFA%20FY%2014.pdf (last accessed Dec. 18, 2014), for
information on Maryland’s utilization of Byrne grant funds.
202
It is important to note the persistent reduction of Byrne funding provided to
Maryland within the past few years. The 10% penalty reduced from $2.5 million in
fiscal year 2010 to approximately $622,500 in fiscal year 2012. See supra note 198,
at 3.
203
See supra Part III.a.
204
The sentencing court in Mr. Doe’s 2006 criminal case in 2006 noted that it was
impressed with Mr. Doe’s life, responsibility, and rehabilitative efforts since the sex
offenses for which he was convicted. The court believed it unlikely that Mr. Doe
would reoffend. Doe I, 430 Md. at 539, 62 A.3d at 125.
205
See MD. CODE, PUB. SAFETY § 1-401 (2013).
206
MARYLAND SEXUAL OFFENDER ADVISORY BOARD, Report to the Governor and
the Maryland General Assembly, at 6 (2011), available at
http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/Exec/DPSCS/PS1-401(h)_2011.pdf.
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obligation based in part upon a risk assessment.207 While an immediate threat
of the risk to public safety created in the wake of the recent Doe opinions is a
tenable argument, the Board is well-equipped to address strategies to
counteract this risk.208
C. Reasonable Alternative Procedures or Accommodations
Should Maryland lawmakers and regulators choose to attempt to sustain
substantial compliance in the wake of Doe I and Doe II, SORNA provides the
standards of implementation.209 Maintaining substantial implementation in
Maryland’s circumstance requires the “[U.S.] Attorney General and the
jurisdiction [to] make good faith efforts to accomplish substantial
implementation of this subchapter and to reconcile any conflicts between this
subchapter and the jurisdiction’s constitution.”210 Further, the Attorney
General “may determine that the jurisdiction is in compliance with this chapter
if the jurisdiction has made, or is in the process of implementing reasonable
alternative procedures or accommodations, which are consistent with the
purposes of this chapter.”211
Maryland regulators and officials would need to work with the Attorney
General in determining how, in light of Doe I and Doe II, the retroactivity
component of SORNA’s applicability could be omitted while still
207

See id. The proposed administrative process involves a risk assessment
implemented by the Department’s Collaborative Offender Management/Enforced
Treatment containment team. Id. However, the Board suggested in its 2011 report
that it did not want to “risk losing its status as ‘substantially compliant’ with
[SORNA].” See id. at 33.
208
For example, the Board could recommend that the Department incorporate
screening for prior sex offenses into a tool utilized to actuarially assign increased
supervision levels among current probationers and parolees. This would bolster
supervision requirements for pre-SORNA sex offenders who have re-entered the
criminal justice system for non-sex offenses. The Board could also examine other
state’s statutes and policies for guidance.
209
Theoretically, Maryland lawmakers could take a conservative approach such as
re-codifying the sex offender registration scheme outside the Criminal Procedure
Article, relaxing offender registration and community notification requirements,
expressly stating a civil legislative purpose, or re-writing some of the registration
statutes and procedures to avoid the punitive effects outlined in Doe I. See, e.g., Doe
I, 430 Md. at 573, 62 A.3d at 146 (Harrell, J., concurring) (“As long as a registration
statute is tailored narrowly to prevent repetition of sex offenses and requires only
qualifying sex offenders to register . . . it is not excessive in its deterrent purpose.”)
(citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 103-04 (2003)). A constitutional amendment of
Article 17 to avoid the result in Doe I, while theoretically possible, is improbable.
210
42 U.S.C. § 16925 (b)(2). The Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed the effect
§ 16925 of SORNA had on its opinion in Doe II. 439 Md. 201, 234, 94 A.3d 791,
810.
211
42 U.S.C. § 16925 (b)(3).
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substantially implementing SORNA’s standards.212 Likewise, the Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services would have to scrutinize its
implementation of SORNA and other regulations and policies in determining
methods to sustain substantial implementation without retroactive
application.213 However, SORNA and its retroactive implementation by the
Attorney General remains the standard, despite the purely offense-based
classification methodology that is being called into question in Maryland and
other states.214 This represents a much larger problem for Congress and the
Attorney General in legislating and implementing a federal policy, the
effectiveness and propriety of which is being questioned on a national stage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Maryland was deemed to have substantially implemented SORNA in
Summer 2011 with the addition of certain required registration components.215
However, Maryland policymakers are now faced with a decision following the
court of appeals decisions in Doe I and Doe II regarding options for
appropriate treatment and supervision of sex offenders convicted prior to the
enactment of Maryland’s sex offender registration scheme. Policymakers
should closely examine other states’ decisions to abandon implementation of
SORNA because of its legal, practical, and financial barriers to
implementation. Maryland has moved toward risk-based and efficient
offender management techniques.216 Our state now has opportunity and
212

The Attorney General would also have to work with all other states with ex post
facto and other state-constitutional problems in reconsidering the retroactive
registration aspect of SORNA’s standards.
213
In assessing compliance, the SMART Office will look at rules, administrative
policies and procedures, and statutes. 2008 Guidelines, supra note 17, at 38047.
214
“Applying such a broad-reaching statute like Maryland’s to any qualifying sex
offender without particularized determinations of recidivism may undermine the
law’s intent to prevent the repetition of sex offenses[.] Indeed, recent research
reports that broad-reaching sex offender registration and notification laws do not
reduce recidivism by sex offenders.” Doe I, 430 Md. at 573, 62 A.3d at 146 (Harrell,
J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). See also FINAL REP. OF THE CRIM.
JUSTICE & PUB. SAFETY COMM., STUDY OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION LAWS,
123d Leg., 2d Sess., at 18 (Me. Nov. 2008) (recommending a combined risk- and
offense-based registration scheme), available at
http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/sexoffender2008report.pdf.
215
MARYLAND SEXUAL OFFENDER ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 206, at 53.
216
For example, Maryland’s Violence Prevention Initiative violent offender
supervision strategy utilizes a risk-based assessment tool to intensely supervise highrisk offenders and has been met with substantial success in reducing violent crime
during the O’Malley administration. See GOCCP Fact Sheet, Violence Prevention
Initiative, available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/documents/VPI-FactSheetB.pdf; Maryland DPSCS fact sheet: Keeping Communities Safe: Parole &
Probation: Violence Prevention Initiative, GOCCP, available at
http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/initiatives/one_sheets/VPI-One-Sheet-Feb-2010.pdf.
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occasion to expand similar practices and strategies to the management of sex
offenders within constitutional bounds and potentially without the assistance
of the policy of the federal government.

